

# A Guide to Understanding and Complying with International Sanctions





## A Guide to Understanding and Complying with International Sanctions

---

Author:

**Maximilian Hess**

---

This manual was composed with the generous support of the U.S. Department of State. The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect or represent the views and opinions of the Center for Strategy and Development (CSD) or the U.S. Department of State.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

INTRODUCTION	01
FORMS OF SANCTIONS	03
SECTORAL SANCTIONS	06
EXPORT AND IMPORT SANCTIONS	07
SANCTIONS LEGISLATION AND AUTHORITIES	10
CASE STUDIES	15
TRENDS IN SANCTIONS – JULY 2024	18

# INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to serve as a guide to how to understand, recognize, and evaluate sanctions in all of the key forms that they take today. In order to do so the paper begins with a section on the 'Forms of Sanctions' that details the major types and structures of sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom, as well as a brief introduction to other prominent international sanctions programs and regimes. In the subsequent 'Sanctions Legislation and Authorities' section, the paper details the processes, regulations, legislation and governmental bodies that determine what sanctions are imposed in an accessible manner to enable the reader to enhance their own ability to assess sanctions risks, understand trends, and develop best practices for compliance. The paper then details three case studies of sanctions highlighting enforcement action and media coverage evidencing trends in sanctions evasion, red flags, as well as the crucial importance of sanctions to international efforts to limit corruption, counter aggression and crimes against humanity, and protect international trade and investment. Finally, this paper concludes with a section on 'Trends in Sanctions' aimed at enabling the reader to understand how sanctions are changing, likely to develop, and ensure that they can apply best practices going forward.

The primary target of international sanctions today is Vladimir Putin's Russia, and regrettably he shows no indication of being willing to reverse his expansionist aims in Ukraine nor threats against other neighbors. Therefore, however, it is important to understand how thinking about sanctions have been developed.

In the immediate aftermath of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion, Russia swiftly became the 'world's most sanctioned nation,' with 2,778 new designations announced in two weeks thereafter.<sup>1</sup> This was an internationally-coordinated effort, bringing together the wider West from the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and close allies such as Canada, Japan, and Australia but also third countries who had not sanctioned Russia following its 2014 invasion of Ukraine in contrast to those such as Switzerland, Singapore, and South Korea.<sup>2</sup> Sanctions have only continued to expand against Russia in each of these countries cases since. However, the difference in those countries imposing sanctions against Russia between 2014 and 2022 sanctioning countries also underlines a key trend, which Russia's wanton war in Ukraine has driven, in the expansion of international sanctions, and which can help to better understand their aims and purposes.

Sanctions are widely understood to serve to purposes, first as a deterrent tool to try and prompt the countries and actors targeted by them to either take or not take a certain action. The history of sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa, driven by the Global South and eventually joined by the wider West, are arguably the prime example of such sanctions pushing a regime to take certain action. Their impact on the apartheid regime played an important role in promoting the diplomatic process that helped with the introduction of democracy in 1994. One of the landmark analyses of sanctions in the post-Cold War-era, Daniel Drezner's *The Sanctions Paradox* explains how such sanctions can be effective, and when they are unlikely to be.<sup>3</sup> Most notably it found that sanctions are more effective in deterring or promoting actions in allies – comparing the history of sanctions threats from the United States against South Korea over its flirtations

with a nuclear weapons program against those levied against North Korea for its action doing so – and that they are more likely to result in changes in policy from regimes that are responsive to their domestic populations and where democratic checks and balances are in place. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is none of these things, but many of the sanctions imposed after the illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of large parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014 were aimed at deterring Russia. New tools were even developed to emphasize this, as will be discussed in the discussion of ‘sectoral sanctions’ in the next section.

Sanctions are not limited to being used as a deterrent, however. They can also be used to directly target the ability to procure weapons and other materiel as well as to finance a war effort. There is ample historical precedent for such sanctions, and they have played a key role in conflicts throughout not only the Modern Era – sanctions on Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan stretched not from blockades to asset seizures to trading bans – but also throughout history, trade blockades have been recorded since earliest recorded conflicts. The difference between deterrent sanctions and these forms of sanctions is encapsulated in two other key studies of sanctions: Nicolas Mulder’s *The Economic Weapon* and Jennifer Harris and Robert Blackwill’s co-written *War By Other Means*.<sup>4</sup> Broadly seen, these are sanctions that directly target a state’s capacity.

In the case of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, this role of sanctions is clear. The sanctions targeting Russia’s central bank in the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion froze roughly \$310 billion, half of the ‘war chest’ that Putin had spent the preceding decade building up.<sup>5</sup> Sanctions on exports to Russia directly target the computer chips that the Kremlin depends on for its missiles guidance system and those on CNC machine tools target Russia’s ability to create firing pins to put into the hands of its soldiers. Sanctions on Russia’s banks and financial system aim to limit the Kremlin’s ability to turn the profits from its oil and commodities output to the benefit of the Russian Armed Forces, while mitigating the risk that the Kremlin will further use these same exports as tools of geopolitical pressure, something it has done across Eurasia even before its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In fact, the first use of sanctions in the Ukrainian context were all by Russia, from its cutting-off of gas deliveries in 2006 to its bans on Ukrainian imports in 2013 as the Euro-maidan Revolution was still gaining steam and Ukrainians demanded the finalization of their aspirations for an Association Agreement with the European Union.<sup>6</sup> Today, the sanctions most widely employed internationally are those tailored to try to mitigate Russia’s war machine and its capability to execute Putin’s aggressive intents.

Given Russia’s proximity to Georgia, its occupation of the Tskhinvali region and other parts of Georgia’s Shida Kartli Region (which it dubs ‘South Ossetia’) and Abkhazia, and Russia’s vast efforts to try and evade sanctions, it is undoubtedly the Russia sanctions regime that will be the most important for a Georgian audience. That is not to say that knowledge of and understanding of other sanctions regimes is not beneficial, particularly in relation to sanctions issued by the United States that, as will be detailed further, carry an ‘extraterritorial’ dimension not currently matched by any other sanctions regime. For example, Iranian actors have sought – unsuccessfully – to use Georgia for sanctions evasion in the past.<sup>7</sup> While there are tools that have been developed to target Putin’s regime specifically, such as the G7’s Oil Price Cap, the overall structure and form of sanctions by key countries bear broad similarities. An overview of their form and function will enable an understanding of the sanctions environment not only with regard to Russia but across the geopolitical landscape.

# FORMS OF SANCTIONS

## BLACKLIST SANCTIONS

The United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and other sanctions imposing countries all have various forms of sanctions, which differ from one to another, but all implement a form of sanctions that bar access to assets and new financial transactions. These are both the most 'basic' form of sanction and their most explicit form given. They can target businesses, entities, and individuals, and they mean that no business of any kind can be done with those named entities without explicit approval of the relevant sanctions imposing authority. Terms and labels vary across those authorities but broadly they can be understood as 'blacklist sanctions' – those who end up on these lists are essentially cut off from the economies imposing them and from third countries that comply with these sanctions. Violators of blacklist sanctions face potential criminal penalties including custodial sentences, fines, and themselves being designated to sanctions.

### *US Blacklist Sanctions – 'Specifically Designated National'*

The most significant blacklist designation is the United States' – the 'specifically designated national,' also referred to by its acronym, SDN. The US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) is the authority that imposes and oversees them and it explicitly differentiates between SDN and non-SDN sanctions lists, as the latter restrictions are significantly less impactful. Inclusion on the SDN list bars the named entity, individual, or organization from having access to the US financial system and almost all other services with only limited exceptions for legal services. Although visa bans can be issued as part of non-SDN sanctions, all individuals subject to SDN sanctions are automatically barred from the United States without exceptional approval as well.

Notably SDN designations are also aggregable, meaning that an entity that is majority owned by sanctioned individuals is automatically treated as being under those sanctions as well regardless of their individual ownership share. For example, if an entity has 5 minority shareholders all of whom are under SDN sanctions but each of these shares are just 10.001%, then the restrictions resulting from the individual SDN designations apply to this entity in question as well.

SDN sanctions have been imposed against not only members of Vladimir Putin's inner circle and numerous elements of the Russian war machine but are also used in designations for targeting terrorist groups and other malign actors. It is available directly from the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Controls' website as well as numerous other sanctions databases.

As will be explained further in detail in the subsection entitled '[Extraterritoriality and the US Nexus](#)', what is most notable about the US' SDN sanctions – and all US sanctions more is their 'extraterritorial' factor in terms of their applicability, i.e. that the Office of Foreign Assets Controls and the US Department of

Justice will enforce compliance with them outside of the physical borders of the United States.<sup>8</sup> For the researcher, practitioner, analyst, or compliance reviewer, what this means is that there should be an assumption that US sanctions can apply regardless of where a business transaction is located or a counterparty is based. Some of the largest fines for violations of sanctions have been related to transactions between institutions and companies headquartered in third countries and executed entirely abroad.

### *UK Blacklist Sanctions*

The United Kingdom's does not have an immediate equivalent of the United States' 'Specifically Designated Nationals' SDN list but inclusion on the 'UK Sanctions List' can also result in a blacklisting sanction. The UK Sanctions List includes individuals, entities, and ships subject to financial sanctions imposed by the UK government. These sanctions can encompass asset freezes, travel bans, and other restrictive measures, most notably 'trust services,' a fairly recent innovation aimed at cracking down on sanctions evasion using structures, which had been particularly favored by Russian high-net worth individuals targeted by sanctions.<sup>9</sup> However, unlike the US' SDN list, there is not a separate list for 'blacklist' sanctions versus more tailored sanctions. The closest equivalent is those who are listed as subject to an asset freeze, trust services sanctions, and travel bans.

One additional key area of difference between the UK and US 'blacklist' sanctions is that such sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom are not subject to 'aggregation'. Whereas if two entities or individuals subject to the US' SDN designation each own a 25.01% stake in a third entity, bringing their joint ownership above 50% and thus resulting in that third entity also being subject to the US' SDN designation, the United Kingdom's sanctions "would not aggregate different designated persons' shareholdings in a company, unless, for example, the shares or rights are subject to a joint arrangement between the designated persons or one designated person controls the rights of another designated person"<sup>10</sup>.

The UK Sanctions List is managed and published by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), which is part of His Majesty's Treasury (HMT), the British equivalent of the Finance Ministry. The UK Sanctions List can be found on the official UK government website, and is available from numerous third party database providers as well.

### *EU Blacklist Sanctions*

The European Union, like the UK, does not operate one explicit 'blacklist' as the United States does instead also operating a unified sanctions database known as the 'EU Consolidated List of Sanctions'. The list comprises individuals, entities, and bodies subject to restrictive measures imposed by the EU. Those subject to asset freezes and travel bans are broadly the equivalent of the SDN designation, with all services except for legal services restricted for individuals thus designation. However, the European Union does offer some more recourse to legal challenges against listings than has typically been found in the United Kingdom and United States, though not enough that any such challenges have posed a significant threat to the system and the bloc's ability to impose such sanctions.

For entities and corporations found on the list, it also governs additional trade restrictions that have been imposed by the bloc, from limiting access to the European market to barring goods for export.

The EU Consolidated List of Sanctions is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and available from the bloc's websites as well as most databases. Enforcement and licensing of normally prohibited activity falls to national sanctions authorities in the EU's 27 member states. However, on 24 April 2024 the European Parliament and European Council finalized the introduction of new directive that formulates bloc-wide rules for defining criminal offences and penalties for violation's of the blocs standards that member states are required to bring into law by 20 May 2025<sup>11</sup>.

### *Magnitsky Sanctions*

The Magnitsky Sanctions Regime – also known as the Global Magnitsky Sanctions – have been developing since 2012 and are a form of sanctions that aim to punish human rights violators. They were first brought into US legislation in 2012 but the current model form, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, initiated by the United States in 2016, established the current standard sanctions regime targeting foreign individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses and corruption.

Named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who died in a Moscow prison after exposing government corruption, this legislation allows for visa bans and asset freezes against those implicated in serious human rights violations and significant acts of corruption worldwide. The Magnitsky sanctions regime enables targeted actions against individuals and entities from any country, rather than being limited to specific nations or conflicts, which means that there are differing bodies of law overseeing its enforcement in the United States in particular, namely that it has the backing of explicit law in addition to respective executive orders<sup>12</sup>. In layman's terms, this just means that the underlying authorities cannot be overturned solely by presidential action as is the case with sanctions that rely solely on executive orders and which are typically related to a particular conflict or crisis. However, the effect of inclusion on the Global Magnitsky designation is effectively the same as being under SDN designations in the US or blocklisting sanctions in the EU or UK.

Since the introduction of the U.S. Global Magnitsky Act, several other countries have adopted similar frameworks. Canada implemented its own Magnitsky Act in 2017, and the United Kingdom followed suit with the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations in 2020. The European Union adopted its version, the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, in December 2020. Australia joined this group with the passage of the Autonomous Sanctions Amendment (Magnitsky-style and Other Thematic Sanctions) Bill in December 2021. These regimes collectively represent a coordinated international effort to hold human rights violators and corrupt actors accountable, leveraging economic and diplomatic tools to promote global human rights standards.

Key designations under these regimes highlight their impact and reach. For instance, under the U.S. Global Magnitsky Act, in 2018, the Treasury Department sanctioned Saudi officials implicated in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In Canada, individuals from Myanmar's military were sanctioned in response to human rights abuses against the Rohingya population. In 2020, the US sanctioned a businessman in Kyrgyzstan whose significant corruption in the state customs service had been revealed by investigative journalists. The UK sanctioned Russian officials involved in the detention and torture of LGBTQ individuals in Chechnya in 2021. The key difference for Magnitsky sanctions to SDN and other blacklisting programs is that they have a global targeting scope rather than one predefined by the response to a particular conflict or crisis as is the cast in most (but not all) other sanctions programs.



# SECTORAL SANCTIONS

Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom implemented a series of sectoral sanctions targeting various sectors of the Russian economy. These were a special new sanctions regime aimed directly at the Kremlin and which sought to pressure Russia into changing its actions in Ukraine. Given the aforementioned shift in sanctions focus from seeking to deter Russia towards seeking to constrict its war machine following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they have received considerably less attention but remain in force. However, numerous companies that were subject to sectoral sanctions designations have since been targeted with blacklisting designations that supersede the sectoral sanctions, for example the Russian State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank or VEB). Violators of sectoral sanctions face a risk of criminal penalties, fines, and themselves being designated to sanctions.

## *US Sectoral Sanctions – ‘SSI List’*

The form of sectoral sanctions introduced by the United States and administered as with the SDN list through OFAC is the ‘Sectoral Sanctions Identification List’. There are four key directives that can be triggered for companies that are listed as on the SSI list; at least one must be included for a SSI designation although they are in fact the key restrictions imposed.

These have been slightly adjusted on numerous occasions over the last decade but in their present form consist of the following: Directive 1: prohibits the issuance of new equity or debt with a maturity of longer than 14 days for targeted financial sector companies; Directive 2: a prohibition on the receipt of services or technology in the support of Arctic offshore, shale, or deepwater oil projects in Russia for targeted companies; Directive 3: a prohibition on engaging or transacting in new equity or debt with a maturity of over 14 days for Russian defense-related entities; and Directive 4: a prohibition on the issuance of new debt or equity with a maturity of longer than 14 days for targeted energy companies.

As with US SDN sanctions, there is also an extraterritorial aspect to enforcement of US sectoral sanctions designations. Although they have in many cases been superseded, enforcement of sectoral sanctions violations remains tight even for technical violations with the most recent such action having been a settlement with OFAC by a major US financial services firm, State Street, on 26 July 2024.<sup>13</sup>

## *EU and UK Sectoral Sanctions*

The United Kingdom and European Union do not operate a separate sanctions list differentiating those entities explicitly under blacklist sanctions from those under sectoral sanctions, with the differences instead listed on their respective ‘UK Sanctions List’ and ‘EU Consolidated List of Sanctions’. Entities subject to the EU's sectoral Sanctions are listed in Annex III of Council Regulation 2022/328<sup>14</sup>. The restrictions imposed under both the EU and UK sanctions largely mirror the US restrictions although prior to 2022 the time limit on debt maturities for affected firms was 30 days rather than 14 days. The EU also uses its sectoral sanctions regime under the aforementioned regulation to oversee the provision of financial services and investment advice to Russian financial institutions.

# EXPORT AND IMPORT SANCTIONS

While blockades are perhaps the deepest-rooted form of interstate economic competition, today they are often issued in a more targeted form, with regulations, legislation, and even tax and tariff structures designed to proscribe trade with affected countries, entities, individuals and even whole markets. These can be evidenced on a comparatively small-scale in ‘trade wars’ and even anti-dumping measures but are also used more extensively for matters of international and national security rather than economic competition. In short, they are also used as a form of sanctions – such as the decades-long ban on the import of Cuban cigars to the United States or even the prohibition of arms exports to conflict zones overseen at the United Nations level. They too have proliferated in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and range from tariffs targeting the export of Russian fish to the United Kingdom to the ban of radio, automotive, computer technology and even intellectual property to Russia. Without these imports, the Russian war machine would not be able to function in a modern state.<sup>15</sup> These export sanctions too are the result of international cooperation efforts and depend on compliance not just in the countries issuing the underlying export restrictions but also third countries and global logistics networks that handle portions of the supply chain from production to re-export. The sanctions that target Russia’s exports also play an important role in limiting the Kremlin’s revenues and thus its ability to fund its war machine as well as to enable the countries imposing them, as well as those adhering to them, to mitigate the potential for Russia’s economic aggression, which played such a key role in riling global gas markets and prompting inflation in 2019 to 2023 both in Europe and markets as far afield as Pakistan.<sup>16</sup>

## *Arms bans and dual use export restrictions*

In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western nations, including the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, imposed bans on the export of arms and cancelled the few existing supply agreements by Western defense firms to Russia. However, the restrictions imposed on Russia’s defense industry and military went notably further and included the introduction of restrictions on so-called ‘dual-use items, which have both a civilian and military application. As part of the broader sanctions effort aimed at curbing Russia's military and technological advancements, dual-use items were identified as critical in limiting Russia's access to advanced technology that could enhance its defense capabilities as well as to retard Russian production of military hardware. The dual use export restrictions targeted sectors such as energy, aerospace, and information technology, thereby impeding Russia's ability to modernize its military infrastructure and conduct sophisticated cyber operations. The key restrictions are applied to products, technology and underlying intellectual property rather than sanctioned or otherwise designated individuals and entities – meaning that their import by any Russian counterparty is proscribed. Examples of goods proscribed include microprocessors, machine tools and ball bearings. They are identified by the respective sanctions-imposing authorities by their HS6 codes, part of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, the international standard overseen by the World Customs Organization that governs trade reporting amongst member states.

Beginning in 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, these dual-use export restrictions were significantly expanded and intensified. The scope of restricted items was broadened to include a wider array of technologies, components, and materials essential for military and industrial applications. This expansion was coordinated among Western allies to ensure comprehensive coverage and effective enforcement. A key component of this strategy was the introduction of the Common High Priority Items List, which identified specific high-tech goods and technologies crucial for Russia's military and economic sectors. By targeting these high-priority items, Western nations aimed to disrupt Russia's supply chains, degrade its military capabilities, and exert economic pressure to deter further aggression.

The Common High Priority Items List is also yet another example of key international cooperation in these efforts as it is overseen by the so-called Export Enforcement Five (E5), a grouping of Canada, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand, who also work together to issue joint compliance guidance.<sup>17</sup> Japan and the European Union have also joined together in the effort and brought in the Common High Priority Items list for their own dual-use export restrictions while countries such as the Republic of China (Taiwan), South Korea, Singapore and Switzerland have also adapted broadly overlapping restrictions.

The lists are available from respective government websites and efforts are underway to create large databases. Ukraine also maintains its own sanctions list, which is at the minimum a useful tool particularly given it evidences directly how certain goods are used in Russia's war machine. However, the key resource is undoubtedly the United States' Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) given the role of US extraterritoriality. The BIS, as with the other aforementioned authorities, maintains its own version of the Common High Priority Item list on its website, but also maintains 'entity,' 'debarred' and 'denied persons' lists that are relevant for other sanctions programs as well as for red flagging exercises for exports to third countries, particularly those with established Russian trade linkages.<sup>18</sup> The US list is also particularly important as well given that it also has applicable extraterritorial dimensions, for example a product containing US goods or intellectual property that is being re-sold by a company in a third country abroad also faces risks of sanctions and fines if it exports such goods to Russia without approval from BIS, even if they are used.

### *Russian Oil Sanctions – G7 Price Cap*

One of the most significant sets of Russian exports are those initially agreed by the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as well as the European Union and Australia in December 2022, the so-called 'oil price cap' that aims to limit potential revenues earned by the Kremlin from Russian oil sales. The group of countries enforcing the cap is collectively known as the G7+ Price Cap Coalition and also now includes Japan.

In its simplest form, the oil price cap bars the provision of services and interactions with Russian oil that is sold above \$60 per barrel for crude oil, \$100 per barrel of value-added refined products such as jet fuel and diesel, and \$45 per barrel for refining derived products such as fuel oil.<sup>19</sup> It came into effect in February 2023<sup>20</sup> and the accompanying price cap compliance regime overseen by the G7+ Price Cap Coalition was updated on 20 December 2023. This required that coalition service providers receive attestations from counterparties every time that they move or load Russian oil and also required that supply chain participants seek access to itemized ancillary costs such as insurance and freight and to share these with others in the supply

chain. This adaption was aimed at mitigating Russia's evasion efforts, which at that point largely consisted of formally selling the oil at just below the price in the cap but then over-charging for insurance and shipping costs so as to make up the difference, enabling partners to feign compliance. Compliance with the regime is overseen by respective sanctions authorities in the G7+ Price Cap Coalition countries but even for companies operating outside these countries they must take into account the risks posed to supply chain partners elsewhere, as well as their own exposure to any nexus of US or other third countries sanctions, including their own ability and existing linkages for procuring insurance or other financial services internationally.

### *Sanctions on Russian Commodity Exports*

The United States, United Kingdom and European Union have also imposed sanctions barring the import of Russian metals, in particular steel, as well as gold and diamonds. The European Union has typically been later in joining in restricting trade in Russian-sourced diamonds and gold, and its current sanctions restricting the import of Russian metals are less extensive than those of the United States and the United Kingdom following their most recent sanctions in this sphere, issued on 12 April 2024 that barred Russian metals producers from supplying the London Metal Exchange and Chicago Mercantile Exchange including their warehouses abroad in third countries in addition to direct bans on the import of Russian steel, aluminum, copper and nickel.<sup>21</sup>

In contrast to the EU and UK, the EU continues to allow the import of Russian copper, aluminum and nickel and there are also some exceptions to its import restrictions on Russian steel and iron<sup>22</sup>. However, given the large number of Russian metals companies that are subject to SDN and other blacklisting sanctions, including the EU's own, the overall level of Russian metals exports to Europe has fallen significantly compared to the pre-war years as well, including those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, the European Union, United States and United Kingdom have all banned Russian direct oil imports, although a handful of exceptions have temporarily been in the EU for Bulgaria,<sup>24</sup> Hungary and Slovakia.<sup>25</sup>

It is likely that further sanctions will be imposed on Russian exports in the foreseeable future, as discussed further in the 'Sanctions Trends' Section. There are already some areas of growing differentiation between countries, however, and in May 2024 the United States became the first country to ban the import of Russian Uranium, in the form of legislation passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Joe Biden, though this will be phased in over the coming four years.<sup>26</sup>

As with other sanctions programs, violations of Russian export sanctions include potential criminal penalties, fines, and additional sanctions. Finally, it should be noted that the above examples are not exhaustive and there are significant additional other sanctions measures imposed on Russia such as bans on Russian rail and truck freight providers from entering the European Union or the bloc's ban on EU gas resales agreed in June 2024 as well as broad prohibitions issued by OFAC on U.S. persons from investing in new Russian businesses, equity, and loans.<sup>27</sup>

# SANCTIONS LEGISLATION AND AUTHORITIES

There are a myriad array of governing authorities, pieces of legislation, and regulations that underpin international sanctions regimes. This section aims to give a broad introduction to these in the key sanctions-imposing jurisdictions of the United States, European Union and United Kingdom. In many ways, they are the most straightforward in the UK given the relatively recent introduction of underlying frameworks (as part of the Brexit process, though it should be noted that almost all sanctions introduced when the UK was a member of the European Union were brought into domestic legislation). They are arguably at their most complex in the United States – where, as aforementioned in the sub-section section on Magnitsky sanctions, there can be competing and overlapping sanctions authorities issued by different federal agencies as well as by legislation, though there is also substantial complexity in the European Union particularly with regards to enforcement that is left to national authorities and which are still in the process of being standardized across the bloc.

This paper will therefore first delve into the UK sanctions authorities and legislation before moving on to the EU and the United States, finishing with a sub-section on the already-frequently mentioned concept of US extraterritoriality and the US nexus as this gives US sanctions a broader scope than those issued by other countries, including with regards to Russia, which will also be detailed in depth therein.

## *United Kingdom Sanctions Authorities and Legislation*

In the United Kingdom, sanctions are primarily governed and enforced by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI). The agency is responsible for ensuring that financial sanctions are properly understood, implemented, and enforced within the UK. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation was established to improve the understanding, implementation, and enforcement of financial sanctions in 2016, making it a central authority in the UK's sanctions regime. OFSI is also responsible for liaising with industry as well as handling requests for sanctions licenses .

The legal framework for sanctions in the UK is rooted in several key pieces of legislation. The principal legislation is the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA). SAMLA provides the UK government with the power to impose, update, and lift sanctions, including financial, trade, and immigration restrictions, to comply with United Nations obligations or to pursue foreign policy and national security goals. The Act ensures that the UK can continue to implement sanctions independently following its departure from the European Union.

Additionally, specific regulations are issued under SAMLA to address particular sanctions regimes. For instance, regulations can target specific countries, entities, or individuals involved in activities such as terrorism, human rights abuses, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The regulations detail the nature of the restrictions imposed, which can include asset freezes, travel bans, and trade restrictions.

Additional sanctions' enforcement legislation also originates from legislation such as the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 that aim to enhance the enforcement, oversight, and administration of sanctions. Although not explicitly a sanction, this legislation also oversees the United Kingdom's unexplained wealth orders, which can be used to target assets from those who have brought wealth illegally garnered through corruption and other malfeasance to the United Kingdom.

Enforcement of sanctions in the UK involves coordination among various government agencies, in addition to OFSI, such as the National Crime Agency (NCA), and law enforcement bodies under the Ministry of Justice. Additionally, sanctions policy making and analysis is augmented by support from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office as well as the Department for Business and Trade.

### *European Union Sanctions Authorities and Key Legislation*

In the European Union, the imposition and enforcement of sanctions are primarily managed by the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Council of the European Union is responsible for the adoption of sanctions, which are proposed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and agreed upon by all member states. Once adopted, the European Commission ensures the proper implementation and enforcement of these sanctions across the EU.

The legal framework for sanctions in the EU is established by a combination of EU regulations and decisions. The foundational basis for the EU's ability to impose sanctions is derived from the Treaty on European Union (TEU), particularly Articles 21 and 29, which outline the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Within this framework, the EU can impose restrictive measures such as asset freezes, travel bans, and trade restrictions. These measures are implemented through Council Regulations, which are directly applicable in all EU member states, ensuring uniformity across the Union.

Council Regulations serve as the primary legal instruments for implementing sanctions, providing detailed rules and procedures for compliance. These regulations are legally binding and must be adhered to by all individuals and entities within the EU. The European Union has more than 40 different sanctions 'regimes,' the term for separate sanctions programs related to various crisis, conflicts, group of malign actors, or programs instituted by the United Nation and brought into EU legislation. These regimes and their regulations are complemented by Council Decisions, which set out the political context and objectives of the sanctions. The European External Action Service and High Commissioner's Office for Foreign Affairs also play a key role in determining sanctions policy and in diplomatic liaisons with third countries.

Enforcement and licensing, however, are left to national authorities and although there is a process in place to standardize sanctions penalties and costs around the bloc, this can create significant disparities across the European Union's 27 Member States. There has been substantial growth in the number of national authorities since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, such as Germany's establishment of the Central Office for Sanctions Enforcement in May 2022.<sup>28</sup> However, some member states still lack such bodies and sanctions enforcement in these cases is largely left to the respective criminal authorities in that member state.

## *United States Sanctions Authorities and Key Legislation*

The framework for US sanctions is grounded in several key pieces of legislation that provide the legal framework for the U.S. government to impose economic and trade sanctions to achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. However, these pieces of legislation also sit alongside broad US Executive Branch authorities as part of the US Presidency that combine to create the array of sanctions instruments that exist today.

One of the primary statutes is the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917. This law grants the President the power to regulate trade with hostile nations during times of war. TWEA laid the groundwork for future sanctions legislation and was pivotal during World War I and subsequent conflicts. Although its use has been largely supplanted by more modern statutes, the act is a critical part of the historical development of U.S. sanctions policy.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 is arguably the most significant legislation for contemporary sanctions. IEEPA authorizes the President to declare a national emergency in response to any unusual and extraordinary threat to the U.S. that originates from abroad, and to regulate a broad range of economic activities. This act empowers the President to block transactions and freeze assets, providing the executive branch with a powerful tool to address threats to national security and foreign policy.

Another important law is the National Emergencies Act (NEA) of 1976, which provides a framework for the President to declare national emergencies and outlines the procedures for such declarations. The NEA requires the President to specify the statutory powers being invoked and to report to Congress. Although the NEA itself does not provide specific sanctions authority, it is often used in conjunction with IEEPA to implement economic sanctions in the form of presidential executive orders issued to address such emergencies.

OFAC, which operates under the Department of the Treasury, was established through a series of executive orders and regulations rather than a specific legislative act. It is tasked with administering and enforcing economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC's authority comes from the powers granted to the President by laws like TWEA and IEEPA, and the subsequent delegation of these powers to the Treasury Department. OFAC oversees separate sanctions regimes even if, as aforementioned, the ultimate designation tools such as the SDN-listing can be the same. Some programs are also uniquely tailored for specific sanctions regimes, such as the aforementioned sectoral sanctions and the SSI list. These regimes are implemented by Executive Orders, with more than a dozen such executive orders issued by U.S. presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden.

Sanctions against Russia have also been specifically legislated for, as have sanctions against other countries. Sanctions that are thus enacted cannot be unilaterally rescinded by the Executive Branch under the authority of the president, although it should be noted that the respective enforcement authorities such as OFAC are headed by presidential appointees and there is significant discretion with regards to implementing even such legislated sanctions.

The most prominent example of such sanctions legislation is the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, also known as CAATSA, which mandated the maintenance of sanctions regimes that had been initiated by executive orders against Russia in the preceding years and also provided a legislative basis for additional sanctions programs against North Korea and Iran. The CAATSA legislation also called for sanctions against buyers of key Russian arms exports, although there remains substantial discretion in the Executive Branch agencies for determining which measures to imply, as evidenced by the different measures imposed on Turkey, China and India for their purchase of Russia's S-400 missile defense system for example.<sup>29</sup>

Additionally, while OFAC is undoubtedly the most significant and important sanctions imposing agency as well as the key sanctions licensing authority, it is not the sole authority in the United States with respect to sanctions. As aforementioned in the section on export and import sanctions section, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, which is part of the Department of Commerce, plays the key role in overseeing dual use and other technological restrictions as well as determining those prohibited from receiving such exports and providing licenses were required. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State contains the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls which is charged with overseeing and managing the export and import of defense articles and services under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Other branches of the U.S. State Department also play a role in sanctions research, education, observation, and policy making together with the wider Executive Branch. Finally, the Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network, better known as FinCEN, which like OFAC is also part of the U.S. Treasury Department, also plays a role in sanctions reporting violations as well as distributing advisories and notices to enhance compliance.

### *Extraterritoriality and the US Nexus*

There is much confusion about the reach of U.S. sanctions and the authority that they carry internationally, but it is important to remember that such sanctions are part of U.S. law and regulatory codes and that much of the global financial system in particular relies on structures that are also governed by these or which interact intimately with the U.S. financial system. There is not a standard definition of U.S. extraterritorial legislation, in fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has asserted a presumption against the extraterritorial application of US statutes.<sup>30</sup> However, the US Department of Justice and OFAC operate on the basis of determining sanctions violations based on whether there is a US nexus present to the transaction in question at any stage. A U.S. nexus can be present if any of the following conditions are met: (a) if persons with US citizenship/green card are involved, (b) if the products have U.S. content or are a direct product of U.S. technology, (c) if U.S. citizens are taking executive decisions, (d) if the transaction is passing U.S. soil, (e) if it involves U.S. origin intellectual property or products, or (f) if the transactions are passing US systems.<sup>31</sup>

This results in a de facto extraterritoriality for U.S. sanctions' regimes, which is often erroneously referred to as a 'secondary sanctions' applicability. However, 'secondary sanctions' correctly refers to the threat that sanctions will be imposed for violations of sanctions. Yet there is also genuine extraterritorial component to U.S. sanctions although this must be authorized by legislation or executive order.

In the case of the Russia sanctions regime this was the impact of U.S. Executive Order 14114, which was issued by President Joe Biden on 22 December 2023. The order explicitly authorizes the U.S. Treasury and



thus OFAC to "impose on a foreign financial institution the sanctions described (within)... upon determining that the foreign financial institution has: (i) conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of any person designated... for operating or having operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace, or manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy, or other such sectors as may be determined to support Russia's military-industrial base...; or (ii) conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions, or provided any service, involving Russia's military-industrial base, including the sale, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to the Russian Federation of any item or class of items as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce." It also explicitly notes that sanctions can be imposed on foreign financial institutions that engage in such transactions even without a U.S. nexus and if done "knowingly or unknowingly".<sup>32</sup> This was further expanded on by a revision announced by OFAC to its definition of the Russian military industrial on 12 June 2024 to encompass all individuals designated under Executive Order 14024 - the executive order presently underpinning SDN designations related to Russia.<sup>33</sup> The effect of these executive orders and OFAC regulations is that all transactions that violate sanctions with Russian individuals, entities, and organizations on the SDN list now pose a risk of secondary sanctions even when there is no U.S. nexus present.

# CASE STUDIES

## *Case Study One – G7+ Oil Price Cap*

The G7+ Oil Price Cap is a key instrument in restraining Russia's war time profits. Foreign oil sales are the single largest contributor to the Russian federal budget, having amounted to between 30 and 50% thereof for the past decade.<sup>34</sup> These revenues thus directly feed the Kremlin's war chest. And while there have been significant calls from Ukraine and activist communities around the world for Russian oil to be outright sanctioned – for which there is precedent in the U.S. in relation to Iranian oil – the tool has also been structured to try and mitigate the risk that Vladimir Putin will again seek to use his energy supplies as a geo-economic tool to try and garner support for his wanton invasion of Ukraine. If Russian oil exports went to zero, there is a grave risk that global oil prices would skyrocket, triggering crises across the developing and developed world and threatening support for Ukraine's sovereignty and resistance to Russian aggression. The cap was constructed to try and address this concern by limiting the revenues that the Kremlin could gain from its oil sales.

However, the cap relies on compliance and attestations from countries involved in the Russian oil trade that are outside of the G7+ Price Cap Coalition. There are ample such markets, but it is also true that the majority of international shipping insurance and trade finance, alongside other necessary services for enabling the global oil trade, is conducted in the West or by institutions with a nexus to the U.S., EU or UK. The former is particularly the case as oil is internationally traded predominantly in U.S. dollars, and has been for decades. The Kremlin has thus been forced by the cap to spend substantial revenues trying to evade it and to create the structures to do so in friendly jurisdictions and through obfuscating the ultimate ownership of trading entities as well as by obfuscating or misrepresenting bills of lading and other trade instruments.

However, even the most complicated such processes are not immune from sanctions risks. One case study is to be found in a round of U.S. specifically designated nationals listings announced by OFAC on 20 December 2023. This designation, time alongside the aforementioned adjustments to the oil price cap, targeted a series of Hong Kong and UAE-based entities that had sharply increased their trade of Russian oil since the introduction of the price cap and which had done so in violation of the price controls set by the cap.<sup>35</sup> The firms had previously in publicly available media reports from prestigious outlets such as Reuters and Bloomberg, in some cases as early as March 2023.<sup>36</sup> Despite their location in high-risk offshore jurisdictions with no ownership disclosures, sufficient evidence was eventually found to result in their designation. Sanctions are not a perfect tool and often are forced to ultimately catch up to the corrupt actors involved and this was what occurred in precisely this case the case, one ship linked to the network had been sanctioned three months prior, and through tracing its ownership OFAC was eventually able to justify sanctions against the company and key portions of the wider network. This case study also highlights the importance of observing adverse media reports about high risk entities involved, while also evidencing the potential for sanctions to be imposed directly on those who violate sanctions.

## Case Study Two – Blacklisting Russia’s Central Bank’s and SWIFT Sanctions

One of the most impactful sanctions imposed on Russia has been the application of SDN and other ‘blacklisting sanctions’ to the Russian central bank – formally known as the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) - by the United States and other Ukrainian allies just three days after Russia’s full-scale invasion and the cutting-off of the vast majority of Russian banks from the SWIFT interbank messaging system. The immediate impact was to deprive the Kremlin of access to more than \$310 billion of the war chest that it had built up in the lead-up to the invasion – because entities at which the funds, investments and other assets of the CBR were in jurisdictions that imposed sanctions or adhered to them – but there have also been far wider-reaching long-term implications because of the difficulty of transferring foreign currencies in and out of Russia. The impact of this is that there is a discount to the value of foreign ‘hard’ currencies held within Russia.

Put simply, the Russian rouble is not a widely-held or broadly convertible currency abroad, not to mention the Kremlin’s own capital restrictions that have been significantly tightened since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to shore up his regime’s control domestically.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand the currencies of the countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia include the core ‘hard currencies’ of the international economic order, those that are widely convertible and held in reserve by other countries and are used for trade. This is why Russia itself continues to seek to sell its oil in U.S. Dollars. Because of the sanctions on the CBR and the expulsion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, it is extremely difficult for hard currency to move in and out of Russia, whether digitally or physically. Whereas a U.S. dollar is worth the same whether held in a Bahamian bank account, physically in cash in Washington D.C., or even under a mattress in Singapore, as soon as it crosses the frontier with Russia, or another heavily sanctioned country such as Russia, this is no longer the case.

Once again, sanctions are not perfect and hard currency still continues to find a way in and out of Russia. Some banks that remain in Russia are also not yet subject to the SWIFT sanctions, most notably Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Russia’s own state-owned Gazprombank, the latter because of its role in Russian oil and gas sales that continue in line with international interests as explained in the previous case study (though Gazprombank is subject to SSI sanctions). In many cases, however, sending hard currency out of Russia has to be done surreptitiously, action that can result in sanctions violations and thus fines or even secondary sanctions. This has solidified the discount between hard currencies held in Russia and those held without, and is why the brokers engaging in such transactions charge such hefty fees,<sup>38</sup> particularly in the crypto sector.

Additionally, the freezing of the CBR assets has also enabled the use of interest earned by the frozen proceeds and taxed by the European Union to begin to fund Ukraine’s defense,<sup>39</sup> while the G7 has also agreed and is working on a plan to further harness these funds to deliver Kyiv as much as \$50 billion in much needed aid by the end of 2024.<sup>40</sup> The international community behind the Russia sanctions regime has therefore not only found how to deprive Russia of its ‘war chest’ to fund the invasion of Ukraine but also harnessed the assets to help fund Ukraine’s defense against that invasion.

### Case Study Three – The Case of Artem Uss and the Importance of Export Controls

On 19 October 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that a Russian businessman by the name of Artem Aleksandrovich Uss had been arrested in Italy at Washington’s request two days prior. The indictment that was simultaneously unsealed against him revealed that USS had been charged alongside four other Russian nationals and two Venezuelan nationals for a series of sanctions evasion schemes involving the Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) as well as for engaging in sanctions evasion to illegally procure military and dual-use technologies from the United States. The indictment revealed the USS and his accomplices had used a German company, Nord-Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH, as a front to try and disguise these purchases and ultimately to move the goods that were imported by the firm on to Russia, where they were shipped to sanctioned companies and parts of Russia's defense sector.<sup>41</sup>

The network that Uss led was not a simplistic one and involved cash drops, GPS spoofing, and crypto transactions that are all the hallmarks of Russian evasion schemes, but his involvement itself should have set off a major red flag for any partners. At the time of his arrest, Uss’s father was serving as the governor of Russia’s Krasnoyarsk Region and thus a core member of the Kremlin regime.<sup>42</sup> The evidence of the close Kremlin connections only went deeper from there because while awaiting extradition the following March, Uss managed to escape the home where he was being held under detention just a day after an Italian court approved the extradition, ultimately fleeing to Russia, from where he thanked “strong and reliable people” for their assistance, something widely taken to be an nod to the Russian intelligence services.<sup>43</sup>

As of the time of writing in July 2024, Uss remains at large, but that does not mean the sanctions enforcement actions have since stopped. In December 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that a Bosnian national, Vladimir Jovancic, was arrested in Croatia and awaiting extradition to the United States for helping to facilitate Uss's escape.<sup>44</sup> June 2024, Italian police arrested a Russian businessman, Dmitry Chirakadze, resident in Switzerland for allegedly helping facilitate the escape via Slovenia, Serbia, and Bosnia.<sup>45</sup> Uss himself remains wanted, with a \$7 million reward for information related to his arrest.<sup>46</sup> The case is a stark reminder sanctions evasion can carry not only the risk of being sanctioned or fined, but also criminal prosecutions

Despite his escape, the sanctions evasion network that he operated was subsequently shattered. His escape was a failure, as was the belated detection of his scheme that allegedly ran from as early as 2019 but the case nonetheless highlights key aspects of the importance of continuing to improve compliance and crack down on sanctions evasion. It is also a reminder of the importance to the Kremlin of operating such networks, according to the charges against Uss and his accomplices, the parts that his network had smuggled included those used in Russian-made Sukhoi attack planes and “some of the same electronic components obtained through the criminal scheme have been found in Russian weapons platforms seized on the battlefield in Ukraine”.<sup>47</sup> The fact the son of a senior Kremlin ally was involved also highlights the centrality of such schemes to the regime and its elite, and the extent to which they will go to seek to undermine sanctions.

# TRENDS IN SANCTIONS – JULY 2024

Sanctions are an ever-evolving tool, as they must adapt to the substantial evasion and avoidance efforts that the countries, individuals, and entities that are targeted by them engage in. Sanctions have also grown exponentially as a tool not only in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but also been increasingly used to target other geopolitical crises as well as thematic issues such as human rights and corruption, as evidenced by the [Magnitsky Sanctions sub-section above](#). U.S., EU, and UK sanctions authorities continue to issue regular updates of designated entities on a near weekly basis, sometimes more frequently, and insuring that one is abreast of these developments is a key starting point for any practitioner, analyst, or researcher. However, there are also wider themes and trends in sanctions that will play a major role in shaping the wider landscape to come and that deserve to be reviewed here individually. The first thereof is the expansion of secondary sanctions threats even outside of the United States, particularly in the case of the European Union, which is adding an additional major extraterritorial component to the wider regime. The second is the introduction of new rules and procedures that increase compliance requirements on third parties. The third is the growing targeting of high-risk jurisdictions and the development of new tools aimed at mitigating the ability for sanctions’ evaders to set up new corporate structures that mirror previously sanctioned ones but with new entities. A fourth significant trend is the expansion of export controls in the software sector, adapting tools traditionally used predominantly for hardware and technology sanctions. Finally, there are also key trends from other areas sanctions programs, such as those targeting Iran and Venezuela, as well as lessons geo-economic competition such as the trade tensions between China and the wider West, in particular the United States, that while not rising to the level of sanctions nevertheless have applicable lessons and insights for sanctions practitioners. New and as-of-yet unforeseen trends will also develop in the coming years, but by focusing on these at this stage and how to understand them, one can develop an understanding that will help to improve one’s ability to identify these independently in the future.

## *Trend One – The Growth of Secondary Sanctions, or ‘anti-circumvention measures*

The European Union has been preparing for the introduction of its own extraterritorial sanctions regime since June-2023, when the European Commission agreed its 12th package of sanctions on Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This included the introduction of the establishment of a new annex to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the core document underpinning EU sanctions lists, to enable designations against “third-country operators in facilitating circumvention”.<sup>48</sup> This essentially serves to create a new sanctions list that would see those identified subject to restrictions, potentially as significant as the EU’s wider ‘blacklisting sanctions’ discussed above, and is the most explicit step that the European Union has taken thus far to demonstrate that it is, like the United States, willing to sanction actors in third countries for circumventing its sanctions even when they do not have an immediate nexus to the bloc in the transaction, particularly if the avoidance of such a nexus is an essential feature of the structure in questions.

However, much remains undetermined. The European Union has not designated any sanctions evasion facilitators under the measure as of the time of writing in July 2024. It is nevertheless increasingly likely that it will do so even though there remains uncertainty about the extent of the potential view to circumvention as well as how determinations will be agreed – as aforementioned within the EU sanctions enforcement falls to member states while designations are largely, and in the case of the Russia sanctions program almost exclusively, agreed at the bloc level. Some clarity came in the EU’s 14th Sanctions Package in June 2024, which imposed port access bans and provisions of services on vessels that were found as having circumvented the G7+ Oil Price Cap and new bans on Russian nationals owning or holding posts on the supervisory bodies of crypto-asset and custodial services.<sup>49</sup> The former highlights the bloc’s willingness to indeed step concretely towards transactions that do not have a direct EU nexus while the latter highlights the growing focus on cryptocurrency transactions and their role in sanctions. This is a particular area of focus for secondary sanctions developments as crypto-providers are often based in offshore jurisdictions but traditional currency markets will also continue to be a focus. In June 2024 both the U.S. and UK sanctioned the Moscow Exchange that had become the key domestic market for exchanging foreign currency for Russian roubles domestically within Russia.<sup>50</sup>

It will be a major new breaking ground, however, if the EU does soon agree to expand its anti-circumvention measures and begin to directly designate entities, individuals and organizations who engage in the kind of violations laid out in the EU’s 12th sanctions package. The issue remains a contentious one in Europe partially due to the bloc’s own disappointment with the United States’ unilateral re-imposition of sanctions on Iran despite Tehran’s continued adherence to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the ‘Iran Sanctions Deal,’ of 2015 to which European Union members were parties. That extratropical aspects of U.S. sanctions with regards to Iran thereafter meant that European business had to cancel deals in the country despite the bloc’s opposition to the pact’s demise. Europe will therefore not call its measures secondary sanctions, but Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted international collaboration on sanctions in a manner never before seen and Brussels’ measures, while labelled differently, may ultimately have much the same reach.

### *Trend Two – Enhanced Reporting Requirements*

The EU’s 14<sup>th</sup> sanctions package and the U.S. expansion of secondary sanctions in December 2023 and June 2024 discussed above both referenced the G7+ Oil Price Cap and the importance of anti-circumvention measures in enforcing it. One likely additional trend is to be the spread of reporting and enforcement requirements for even third parties related to these transactions. Combining these two trends also indicates that there will be a risk of secondary sanctions for those who evade existing and expanding such requirements.

This gets to the second key trend in sanctions development, that of enhanced reporting requirements that broadly consist of increasing the standard that actors in trade activity have to meet to demonstrate that they have sought to comply with sanctions. It is increasingly clear that it is no longer acceptable to consider compliance an afterthought or a secondary expense – sanctions violations carry the risk of crippling a business at worst but even less critical developments such as adverse media coverage can have significant

cost factors. The December 2023 US Executive Order issued by President Joe Biden made clear that sanctions can be imposed on foreign financial institutions that “unknowingly” engaged in sanctions activity<sup>51</sup>. FinCEN and other U.S. government resources naturally provide plenty of guidance on best practices for compliance but this hints that the burden of proof will increasingly shift towards proving one made an explicit effort to comply with sanctions when probes are launched.

### *Trend Three – New Targeting and Signaling Tools*

These growth of anti-circumvention measures / secondary sanctions and the enhanced compliance requirements are trends that will be most effective if there is broad international support for them, in particular third countries. It is not only for tax optimization reasons that Russian businesses and entities have so long favored tax havens, but also because of their low compliance standards and poor public disclosures.<sup>52</sup> Sanctions authorities in third countries have not shied away from sanctioning entities in such jurisdictions of course, but they continue to lend themselves to being relatively high-risk business environments. International efforts to clamp down on tax evasion have been a key feature of the geopolitical environment for years now, and the campaign’s greatest success was the agreement of a 15% global minimum corporate income tax announced in 2021 and which as of 2024 had been signed by more than 140 countries.<sup>53</sup> This is the build-up of years of work including efforts by a host of international organizations, most prominently 40-country Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that publishes 'black' and 'grey' risk of jurisdictions with weak anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) standards. These lessons are likely to be applied to sanctions as well, and it should be expected that in the coming years the AML/CTF acronym will grow to include a reference to high-risk sanctions jurisdictions as well. Inclusion on the worst of these lists will pose significant costs to jurisdictions willing to entertain evasion and avoidance of key international sanctions.

However, those sanctions imposing authorities cannot themselves rely solely on hoping that compliance standards in high-risk jurisdictions will improve under pressure. Targeting tools are also being developed by these authorities for signaling that an environment is at high risk for sanctions and is known to be engaging in such evasive practices. The clearest such example was the June 2024 announcement by the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security that it was updating its Entity List to include eight addresses in Hong Kong that had been repeatedly used by companies seeking to evade Russia sanctions, meaning that any transactions involving those addresses will now require explicit authorization for exports from the agency.<sup>54</sup> Additional such practices of designating the known trends of sanctions violations likely to be used for identifying not only addresses known to be used in such transactions, but also jurisdictions more generally that are known to have lax company formation services through trusts used to evade Russia sanctions.

### *Trend Four – Software designation*

The geopolitics of software and the potential of such technology to be used for the malign intentions of state, and even private, actors has been a growing area of attention for sanctions authorities and policy makers in recent years. The case of TikTok and its ownership by a Chinese parent, ByteDance, has attracted perhaps the most explicit such attention and in April 2024 the U.S. legislation passed by Congress and signed by President Joe Biden instituted a framework for forcing a sale of the company, which while not a

traditional sanction in the terms of the blocking sanctions, sectoral sanctions, or export sanctions is effectively another such step. It is also falls squarely within well-established precedent led by China, which has long banned most major foreign social media operators from the country. But the seemingly ever-growing importance of cloud-based software and data management tools means that traditional sanctions tools are also being adapted to try and constrain Russia's war machine.

The most explicit such example came in June 2024 when the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that it was imposing new restrictions on software covered by Export Administration Regulation 99 (EAR99).<sup>55</sup> EAR99 goods, typically, are "not specifically controlled for export ... generally can be exported without a license" except in the case of an embargoed or sanctioned country, a prohibited end-user, or used in a prohibited end-use... in which cases (exporters) may be required to obtain a license".<sup>56</sup> The move was accompanied by a new OFAC sanctions determination that prohibits providing Russian persons with certain information technology software.<sup>57</sup> These actions in effect mean that the export of significant amounts of software – even that without an explicit military application to Russia or for the benefit of Russian persons or companies in Russia are now prohibited. Although they do not carry as explicit a secondary sanctions threat as some of the previously mentioned actions create for foreign financial institutions for Russian persons or companies on the U.S. SDN list. They do include carve-outs for Russian persons or companies' abroad, as well as the subsidiaries / assets of such individuals abroad, except in cases where they are used for the benefit of an individual or entity for operations within Russia. Offering to manage such services in a third country for the benefit of a Russian covered person or entity therefore would risk a violation. In cases in which these delineations are unclear, it will be imperative for third country entities engaging with Russian businesses and persons for relevant services seek clarity from OFAC and / or licenses from BIS.

### *Additional Trends*

This paper has focused primarily on explaining the structure of, case studies relating to, and trends from, the Russia sanctions program, but many of these – including the three detailed above – will apply to wider sanctions programs. But the world presently finds itself in an increasingly frantic era of geopolitical competition and it is not only with regards to Russia that new trends are developing. Many of these from other areas of conflict will be relevant to developing practitioners, analysts, compliance officials and executives understanding of this area of risk. It would be impossible to be exhaustive about theme all, but for the purposes of this paper it is worth concluding with some to highlight.

The most immediate are those from the Russia-Western trade war, particularly the measures imposed by the United States. Over the last decade, Washington has been the initial actor on some of the most strident steps such as the banning of Chinese telecommunications providers such as Huawei and ZTE from its markets, but these have increasingly spread elsewhere as well. The trend, however, is increasingly not just on banning Chinese technology – though that is certainly continuing as highlighted by the U.S. passage of legislation, as part of the a major aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, ordering the divestment of banning of the Chinese social media app TikTok – but also on exports of technology to Beijing. The driving factor in this is economic competition rather than attempting to limit their use in an invasion and atrocities as is the case in Russia. Developments continue to emerge at pace with these moving increasingly into



hardware bans but also bans of exporting certain software or allowing it to be on Chinese systems. Data protection is the core underlying factor in much of this, however, and for our purposes this indicates a trend towards sanctions or sanctions-like tools being expanded in scope to cover these considerations as well.

A second consideration is that the cost of highly disruptive technology has never been cheaper – off-the-shelf drones available for under \$100 have been adapted to weapons of combat on the fields of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Adapted jet-skis have been turned into naval drones to target shipping off of the coast of Yemen. Malign actors are paying attention to these developments as well. The most significant sanctions violations – at least as measured by fines - have historically been those involving large financial institutions. But the growth of export controls is something that is not likely to just affect Russia or major areas of geo-economic tensions such as trade wars but also to expand in scope to try and stop terrorist groups and others from gaining such capabilities, even though they rely on what may be low value goods in most markets.

Finally, it has to be noted that Russia remains an extremely hostile actor, not only with regards to Vladimir Putin’s territorial ambitions but also its own willingness to engage in economic warfare. This paper has stressed repeatedly that international cooperation has been key to the sanctions program against Russia thus far, and this will only be enhanced going forward. It will consist not just of solidarity in compelling today, but coming to the aid of countries affected by Russian martial and market-based aggression. The more that can be done today to work together and mitigate Putin’s threat, the less likely it is that further devastation will be wrought tomorrow, and the more the international community can prepare to ensure all members supportive of the international order continue to benefit from it.

# SOURCES

- 1 Wadhams, Nick. 'Russia is Now the World's Most Sanctioned Nation', Bloomberg, 7 March 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/russia-surges-past-iran-to-become-world-s-most-sanctioned-nation>
- 2 Hess, Maximilian. *Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict Between Russia and the West*, London: Hurst Publishers, August 2023. pp. 143-144.
- 3 Drezner, Daniel. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- 4 Mulder, Nicholas. *Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022. & Blackwill, Robert, and Jennifer Harris. *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017.
- 5 Boocker, Sam; Conner, Alexander, and Wessel, David. 'Why do the US and its allies want to seize Russian reserves to aid Ukraine?', The Brookings Institute, 17 June 2024. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-do-the-u-s-and-its-allies-want-to-seize-russian-reserves-to-aid-ukraine/>
- 6 Reuters. 'Gas Crises Between Ukraine and Russia', Reuters, 12 January 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas-timeline-sb/timeline-gas-crises-between-russia-and-ukraine-idUSTRE50A1A720090111/> & Olearchyk, Roman. 'Russia accused of triggering trade war with Ukraine', Financial Times, 15 August 2013. <https://www.ft.com/content/99068c0e-0595-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de>
- 7 U.S. Department of the Treasury. 'Treasury Targets Networks Linked to Iran', U.S. Department of the Treasury, 06 February 2014. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl2287>
- 8 Guo, Jiazhen; Cinelli, Giovanna M.; and Valentstein, Carl A. 'US Sanctions on Russia Have Extraterritorial Implications', Morgan Lewis, 03 March 2022. <https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2022/03/update-us-sanctions-on-russia-have-extraterritorial-implications>
- 9 Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation Blog, 'Trust Services Sanctions update', Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, 21 March 2023. <https://ofsi.blog.gov.uk/2023/03/21/trust-services-sanctions-update/>
- 10 Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, 'UK Financial Sanctions FAQs - Question 4', Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, 19 July 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-financial-sanctions-faqs/uk-financial-sanctions-faqs>
- 11 Official Journal of the European Union. 'Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673' Official Journal of the European Union, 29 April 2024, [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202401226](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401226)
- 12 Office of Foreign Assets Control. 'Global Magnitsky Sanctions - Legal Framework', Office of Foreign Assets Control, 11 June 2024. <https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/global-magnitsky-sanctions>
- 13 Sun, Mengqi, 'State Street to Pay \$7.5 Million to Settle Allegations of Russia-Related Sanctions Violations', Wall Street Journal, 26 July 2024. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-street-to-pay-7-5-million-to-settle-allegations-of-russia-related-sanctions-violations-23167290>
- 14 Official Journal of the European Union. 'Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 of 25 February 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine,' Official Journal of the European Union, 25 February 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R0328>
- 15 Byrne, James; Somerville, Gary; Byrne, Joe; Watling, Jack; Reynolds, Nick; and Baker, Joe. "Silicon Lifeline". Royal United Services Institute, 08 August 2022. <https://static.rusi.org/RUSI-Silicon-Lifeline-final-web.pdf>
- 16 Op. Cit. Hess, *Economic War*. pp. 188-202.
- 17 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. 'Exporting Commercial Goods - Guidance for Industry and Academia,' U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, 26 September 2023. <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/enforcement/3336-2023-09-26-export-enforcement-five-guidance-for-industry-and-academia-priority-hs-codes/file>
- 18 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. 'Dual Use Export Licenses,' U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, 17 June 2024. <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/2-uncategorized/91-dual-use-export-licenses>
- 19 Johnson, Simon; Rachel, Lukasz; and Wolfram, Catherine. 'The design and implementation of the price cap on Russian oil', Centre for Economic Policy Research, 19 August 2023. <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/design-and-implementation-price-cap-russian-oil>
- 20 EU Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. 'Russia sanctions: G7+ Price Cap Coalition members announce revisions to the price cap compliance regime', EU Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, 20 December 2023. [https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/russia-sanctions-g7-price-cap-coalition-members-announce-revisions-price-cap-compliance-regime-2023-12-20\\_en](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/russia-sanctions-g7-price-cap-coalition-members-announce-revisions-price-cap-compliance-regime-2023-12-20_en)

- 21 His Majesty's Treasury. UK and U.S. to clamp down harder on the trade of Russian metals, His Majesty's Treasury, 12 April 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-to-clamp-down-harder-on-the-trade-of-russian-metals>
- 22 Grigorenko, Yuriy. 'European sanctions against steel exports from Russia: status and prospects,' GMK Center, 3 April 2024. <https://gmk.center/en/posts/european-sanctions-against-steel-exports-from-russia-status-and-prospects/>
- 23 Eurostat. 'Reduced levels of EU-Russia trade continue', Eurostat, 22 February 2024. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240222-2>
- 24 NB: Bulgaria's exemption came to an end in 2024
- 25 Lee, Julian. 'Hungary, Slovakia Can Deal With Lukoil Sanctions: Oil Strategy, Bloomberg, 24 July 2024. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-24/hungary-slovakia-can-deal-with-lukoil-sanctions-oil-strategy?sref=BOY81EzP>
- 26 U.S. Department of State. 'Prohibiting Imports of Uranium Products from the Russian Federation', U.S. Department of State, 14 May 2024. <https://www.state.gov/prohibiting-imports-of-uranium-products-from-the-russian-federation/>
- 27 U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Controls. 'FAQ 1054. Do the new investment prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, "the respective E.O.s") prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing debt or equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation?', U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Controls, 22 June 2022. <https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/>
- 28 Bonifassi, Stephane and Bastien, Julie. 'EU Sanctions Enforcement', Global Investigations Review, 29 September 2023. <https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-guide-sanctions/fourth-edition/article/eu-sanctions-enforcement>
- 29 Woody, Christopher. 'Russian weapons are creating a headache for the US as it looks for partners to counter China', Business Insider, 11 May 2021. <https://www.businessinsider.com/india-s400-purchase-risks-us-sanctions-amid-competition-with-china-2021-5>
- 30 Loonam, James P. and Andreoli, Ryan J. 'Extraterritoriality: the US Perspective'. Global Investigations Review, 04 January 2023. <https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-practitioners-guide-global-investigations/2023/article/extraterritoriality-the-us-perspective>
- 31 Hood, Andrew; Tauwahare and Richard; Regiec, Agnieszka Paulina. 'UK, EU and US Sanctions on Russia'. Fieldfisher, 24 July 2024. <https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/services/international-trade/trade-sanctions-blog/uk-eu-and-us-sanctions-on-russia> & Gonzalez, Roberto J. and Thompson, Joshua R. 'ICLG - Sanctions – USA,' International Comparative Legal Guides, 27 September 2023. <https://iclg.com/practice-areas/sanctions/usa>
- 32 Fayhee, Ryan P.; Schlossberg, Andrew R.; and Boyle, Griffin. 'New Executive Order Authorizes the Imposition of Secondary Sanctions on Foreign Financial Institutions Facilitating Russia's Military-Industrial Base and Expands Import Prohibitions on Certain Russian-Origin Products', Akin, 17 January 2024. <https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/new-executive-order-authorizes-the-imposition-of-secondary-sanctions-on-foreign-financial-institutions>
- 33 Fernandez, Andres; Caballer Jr., Gabriel; and Marco, Jacob. 'OFAC Expands Secondary Sanctions Targeting FFIs Transacting with Sanctioned Russian Persons', Holland & Knight, 24 June 2024. <https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/ofac-expands-secondary-sanctions-targeting-ffis-transacting>
- 34 Yermakov, Vitaly. 'Follow the Money: Understanding Russia's oil and gas revenues', Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 17 March 2024, pp.2. <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Follow-the-Money-Russian-Oil.pdf>
- 35 U.S. Department of the Treasury. 'Treasury Tightens the Price Cap with New Sanctions and Updated Guidance', U.S. Department of the Treasury, 20 December 2023. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2008>
- 36 Bloomberg. 'New Kings of Russian Oil Were These Six Traders in December', Bloomberg, 21 March 2023. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-21/new-kings-of-russian-oil-were-these-six-traders-in-december?sref=BOY81EzP> & Zhdannikov, Dmitry and Verma, Nidhi. 'Obscure traders ship half Russia's oil exports to India, China after sanctions', Reuters, 27 July 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/obscure-traders-ship-half-russias-oil-exports-india-china-after-sanctions-2023-07-27/>
- 37 Prokopenko, Alexandra. 'Russia's Capital Controls Are Designed to Aid Putin's 2024 Re-Election', Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 19 October 2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/10/russias-capital-controls-are-designed-to-aid-putins-2024-re-election>
- 38 See, for example, the 4.5% commission advertised by Russian Turkish firm Sky 17 on its website as of 30 July 2024 <https://www.sky17-tr.com> (archived at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20240502054025/https://www.sky17-tr.com/>)
- 39 Associated Press, 'EU sends first \$1.6 billion from frozen Russia assets to Ukraine', Associated Press, 26 July 2024 <https://apnews.com/article/eu-russia-frozen-assets-ukraine-fund-b743697199adccd5187b4b59159b3a54>
- 40 Reuters. 'What is the G7's \$50 billion loan plan for Ukraine?', Reuters, 14 June 2024. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-g7s-50-billion-loan-plan-ukraine-2024-06-14/>

- 41 U.S. Department of Justice. 'Five Russian Nationals and Two Oil Traders Charged in Global Sanctions Evasion and Money Laundering Scheme', U.S. Department of Justice, 19 October 2022. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/five-russian-nationals-and-two-oil-traders-charged-global-sanctions-evasion-and-money>
- 42 U.S. Department of State. 'Artem Aleksandrovich Uss - Transnational Organised Crime Rewards Program', U.S. Department of State, 5 December 2023. <https://www.state.gov/artem-aleksandrovich-uss>
- 43 Op. Cit. Hess, Economic War, pp. 168.
- 44 U.S. Department of Justice. 'Bosnia and Herzegovina National Indicted for Aiding in Escape of Russian Defendant', U.S. Department of Justice, 05 December 2023. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/bosnia-and-herzegovina-national-indicted-aiding-escape-russian-defendantIn>
- 45 Swiss Info. 'Italy arrests businessman over escape of Russian', Swiss Info, 14 June 2024. <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/italy-arrests-businessman-over-escape-of-russian-man-from-house-arrest/80675311>
- 46 Op. Cit. U.S. Department of State. 'Artem Aleksandrovich Uss - Transnational Organised Crime Rewards Program'.
- 47 Op. Cit. U.S. Department of Justice. 'Five Russian Nationals and Two Oil Traders Charged in Global Sanctions Evasion and Money Laundering Scheme'.
- 48 Official Journal of the European Union. 'Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine'. Official Journal of the European Union, 23 June 2023. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.LI.2023.159.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A159I%3ATOC>
- 49 European Union. 'EU adopts 14th package of sanctions against Russia for its continued illegal war against Ukraine, strengthening enforcement and anti-circumvention measures', European Union, 24 June 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_24\\_3423](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3423)
- 50 Agence France Presse. 'U.K. Follows U.S. With Sanctions on Moscow Stock Exchange', Agence France Presse, 14 July 2024. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/13/uk-follows-us-with-sanctions-on-moscow-stock-exchange-a85399>
- 51 Op. Cit. Fayhee, Schlossberg, and Boyle. 'New Executive Order Authorizes the Imposition of Secondary Sanctions on Foreign Financial Institutions Facilitating Russia's Military-Industrial Base and Expands Import Prohibitions on Certain Russian-Origin Products'
- 52 David Parsley, 'Russia sanctions: How much money do oligarchs have in British tax havens and where exactly is it?', iNews, 15 February 2022. <https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/russian-sanctions-uk-where-oligarchs-hide-cash-british-tax-havens-1462085>
- 53 Torkington, Simon. What does the OECD global minimum tax mean for global cooperation?, World Economic Forum Blog, 02 February 2024. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/02/oecd-minimum-tax-rate>
- 54 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security. 'Department of Commerce Announces Additional Export Restrictions to Counter Russian Aggression', U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, 12 June 2024. <https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-additional-export-restrictions-counter-russian>
- 55 Federal Register. 'Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls', Federal Register, 18 June 2024. <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/06/18/2024-13148/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration>
- 56 International Trade Administration. 'Export Control Classification # (ECCN) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR99)', International Trade Administration, Retrieved 14 August 2024 <https://www.trade.gov/eccn-and-export-administration-regulation-ear99>
- 57 Office of Foreign Assets Control. 'Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071', Office of Foreign Assets Control, 12 June 2024. <https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932951/download?inline>

